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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HUGH P. VONZELL RUHSAM, JR. 
Respondent, 
vs. 
JANET ELIZABETH RUHSAM, 
Appellant. 
Case No. 20727 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Should the Judgment of the Lower Court prevail 
unless there is proof of an abuse of discretion or evidence 
of manifest injustice? 
2. Did the Appellant receive an equitable division of 
the assets of the marriage? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a decision of the Lower District 
Court, wherein the Court entered Findings of Fact and Decree 
of Divorce based upon the evidence heard by the Lower Court 
involving an action of divorce as between the Appellant and 
the Respondent, involving a fourteen (14) year old marriage, 
from which there were no children as issue of the marriage. 
Appeal by the Appellant is from the Decree of the Court 
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alleging that the alimony and property distributions decreed 
by the Lower Court constituted an abuse of discretion. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the time of the hearing for divorce before the 
Court, Appellant was forty-nine (49) years of age, (R. 109) 
and the Appelant was a retired Colonel from the U.S. Air 
Force, having retired April 30, 1979. (R. 106) The parties 
were intermarried on December 18, 1970 and no children were 
born as issue of the marriage. (R. 248) The total marri-
age of the parties was fourteen (14) years. (R. 104-105) 
Each of the parties was granted a Decree of Divorce. 
(R. 116) 
The Court awarded to the Appellant a part of the Re-
spondent's military retirement based upon the marriage of 
the parties December 18, 1970, and the retirement of the 
Respondent from the Air Force on April 30, 1979, which 
computed to 31.1% of Respondent's retirement occurring 
during the course of the marriage, for which the Appellant 
was awarded one-half [h) > or the percentage of 15.55 of the 
monthly retirement of the Respondent, which is 15.55% of 
$2,941.00 monthly, (TR. 239) for a monthly retirement allow-
ance to the Appellant in the sum of $457.32, together with a 
further award of alimony by the Respondent to the Appellant 
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The r e s p e c t i v e h e a l t h of the A p p e l l a n t and the R e s p o n -
dent will be d i s c u s s e d u n d e r the i s s u e s . 
SUMMARY OF A R G U M E N T 
There is no e v i d e n c e w h a t s o e v e r to s u p p o r t the a l l e g a -
tions of the A p p e l l a n t that there has been an abus e of 
d i s c r e t i o n by the Court as to the d i v i s i o n of the real and 
personal p r o p e r t y a s s e t s of the p a r t i e s and in the C o u r t ' s 
a w a r d i n g to the A p p e l l a n t a fair share of the m i l i t a r y 
r e t i r e m e n t of the R e s p o n d e n t as d i c t a t e d by the case law of 
the State of U t a h , and as is m o r e p a r t i c u l a r l y set forth 
h e r e i n a f t e r in R e s p o n d e n t ' s B r i e f . 
The p r o p e r t y d i s t r i b u t i o n o r d e r e d by the Court is a 
equal d i s t r i b u t i o n of all of the real and personal p r o p e r t y 
a s s e t s of the p a r t i e s , and the award m a d e by the Court as 
p e r m a n e n t a l i m o n y and as p e r m a n e n t r e t i r e m e n t p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
3 
by the Appellant, together with the assets awarded to the 
Appellant and even considering the previous earning capacity 
which has been admitted as earned by the Appellant, the 
Appellant's monthly income is substantially in excess of the 
needs of the Appellant as was set forth at R. 86 by the 
Appellant's Affidavit as to what the Appellant deemed was 
necessary for continued maintenance, without in any way 
invading or impairing the substantial assets which the 
Appellant has received by reason of the decree of the Court 
in dividing the assets of the parties. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I, 
THE LOWER COURT MADE AN EQUITABLE DIVISION OF ALL ASSETS 
OF THE MARRIAGE 
There is no evidence whatsoever upon which to make 
allegation that the division of assets, as between the 
parties, was inequitable and an abuse of discretion of the 
Court. 
This Court has held in £ox_ vs^ Co^, 532 P.2d 1994 
(Supreme Court of Utah, 1975) that there was no fixed for-
mula which a Trial Judge must follow in making a division of 
properties. In Hamilton vs. Hamilton, 562 P.2d 235 (Supreme 
Court of Utah, 1 9 7 7 ) , this Court stated that it is the 
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prerogative of the Court to make whatever disposition of 
property it deems fair, equitable and necessary for the 
protection and welfare of the parties, and in Jesperson vs. 
Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Supreme Court of Utah, 1980), this 
Court stated that the Lower Court's division of property and 
assets will not be disturbed on appeal unless the record 
shows there has been an abuse of discretion. 
This is a marriage between two (2) adult persons who 
had each been previously marriage, (R. 96) and with no 
children as the issue of the marriage between the parties 
herei n. 
The parties were intermarried on December 18, 1970 and 
were married for a period of fourteen (14) years. (R. 96) 
At the time of the divorce, the Appellant was forty-nine 
(49) years of age, (R. 248) and the Respondent was fifty-six 
(56) years of age. (TR. 217) 
The Appellant, in her Brief, seeks to show that at the 
age of forty-nine (49), she is practically totally incapaci-
tated and requires the lifetime assistance of the Respondent 
because of the Appellant's practical total disability. 
The Appellant produced an expert witness, Dr. Lyle H. 
Archibald, a general surgeon, who is a personal physician to 
the Appellant, as an expert witness in regards to the dis-
5 
ability of the Appellant, and upon cross-examination by 
counsel for Respondent, the following dialogue was recorded 
Question: Okay. Do you see any -- Do 
you see any problems physically from the 
operation you performed on Mrs. Ruhsam 
that would hinder her from gaining some 
type of employment? I am not talking 
about digging ditches, you understand 
that. 
Answer: No, I am sure she is physically 
capable of performing some kind of 
employment or being employed in some 
form of work. 
Question: Such as a secretary maybe? A 
receptioni st? 
Answer: I think 
ski 1 Is she would 
(R. 196-197) 
that some 
be able to 
of those 
do, yes. 
Question: In connection with people 
that have undergone the type of surgery 
you performed and with the prior sur-
gery, do you know whether these people 
would be candidates to receive social 
security benefits? 
Answer: I don't. 
Question: Or SSI benefits? 
Answer: No I don't. (TR. 197) 
Question: Well, let me ask you this 
doctor, I would assume you have per-
formed many of these operations? 
Answer: I have. 
Question: And do you recommend to 
people becoming active after the opera-
tion? 
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Answer: I recommend that they don't 
change their lifestyle, that they con-
tinue doing what they were doing pre-
o p e r a t i v e ^ . 
Question: If they were working, they 
should work and do the things they use 
to do before? 
Answer: Thats right. 
Question: Would you make the same 
recommendation for Mrs. Ruhsam? 
Answer: I would. (TR. 198) 
The Respondent is fifty-six (56) years of age and 
retired from the Air Force with a VA disability rating of 
10%. (TR. 217) At the time of Respondent's retirement from 
the Air Force, he had been married to the Appellant for 
eight (8) years and four and a half (4^) months, for a total 
of 100.5 months. (TR. 217) 
The Court made an equitable division of the assets of 
the parties, by acknowledging that the items of gold, silver 
and cash reserve management accounts that have already been 
divided shall be accepted by the Court and considers it as 
each having received one-half (%) of those assets, which in 
accordance with Exhibit IIP, is a division of $34,542.00 to 
each of the parties. 
The Appellant is possessed of gold coins and silver 
from a prior marriage, with a value in the sum of 
$18,950.00. (Exhibit IIP) 
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The Appellant will further receive the approximate sum 
of $45,500.00 from the sale of real estate divided at the 
time of the Decree of Divorce which added to the previous 
sums possessed or received by the Appellant makes a total 
share of the Appellant in the assets of the marriage in the 
amount of $98,992.00. (Exhibit IIP) 
The Appellant's Affidavit of the funds deemed by the 
Appellant as necessary for her support as set forth in her 
sworn Affidavit, Exhibit R86, evidences a total need of the 
Appellant for the month in the sum of $1,326.50. 
Considering the return on funds in the amount of 
$98,000.00 as set forth hereinabove, which the Appellant 
will possess, plus the participation in the retirement of 
the Respondent in the sum of $457.32, (which will increase 
with cost of living increases granted to retired personnel) 
and alimony in the sum of $600.00 monthly, would appear to 
be a more than equitable share of the earnings of the Re-
spondent, where the Appellant is seven (7) years younger 
than the Respondent, has no issue to care for and in addi-
tion, admits earnings of $200.00 a month from the spare time 
selling of Avon products. 
The calculation and division of the retirement of the 
Respondent was done in accordance with the formula set forth 
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by the Supreme Court in Woodward vs. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 
(Supreme Court of Utah, November 4, 1 9 8 2 ) . 
In DeMard Jones vs. Harriet H. Jones, 8 UAR 14 
P.2d at , this Court ruled on a property dis-
tribution and alimony settlement, wherein the parties were 
married for twenty-eight (28) years, had four (4) children 
as the issue of the marriage, had a retail business as the 
primary income-producing asset of the marriage, where the 
husband was a licensed pharmacist and wherein the wife spent 
her time raising the children, and wherein the alimony was 
in a reducing amount, with the Court holding that the wife 
was awarded only a small portion of the marital assets, 
thereby making the distribution inequitable. 
In the instant matter before the Court, none of the 
elements of the Jones case are present. 
This Court has previously held in Higley vs. Higley, 
676 P.2d 379 (Supreme Court of Utah, 1 9 8 3 ) ; and Dority vs. 
Dority, 645 P.2d 56 (Supreme Court of Utah, 1982) and in 
Engli sh vs. English, 565 P. 2d 409 (Supreme Court of Utah, 
19 7 7 ) , that the Trial Court has broad latitude in such 
matters and the orders distributing property and setting 
alimony will not be lightly disturbed. There is no question 
of a 50/50 division of all of the assets of the marriage 
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misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in 
substantial and prejudicial error; or that the evidence 
clearly preponderates against the findings as made; or a 
serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse 
of discretion. ( Mitchell vs. Mitchell , 527 P.2d 1359, 
Supreme Court of Utah, 1974) 
The contention of the Appellant that the Court abused 
its discretion in giving to each party the exclusive right 
to the use and sale of the property six (6) months at a time 
so that the property might be sold and setting forth the 
division of the personal property in a manner that will 
effectively assist in division of such personal property was 
done in a manner by the Court to expedite and not prolong 
the hostility between the parties, and the Court stated: 
"The Court has considered at length how 
the division of properties might be 
made. The Court deems a suggested 
division of each side to be plagued by 
self-interest. The Court encourages the 
parties to attempt to negotiate the 
details of the division during the next 
thirty (30) days. If they have not 
arrived at a detail split in accordance 
with the general principle that every-
thing is to be divided equally, the 
Court will attempt to make such an 
outline." (R. 95-99) 
The Court further made a division on the basis of the 
Appellant's list of property submitted and used exclusively 
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CONCLUSION 
It is submitted to this Honorable Court that the Court 
has gone the last mile to make an equitable division of all 
of the assets of the marriage as between the parties, and 
that there has been no abuse of discretion by the Court, in 
that every element has been considered from the evidence 
introduced into Court, and there is no evidence w h a t s o e v e r 
of bias or prejudice on the part of the Court or of any 
intent on the part of the Court to do other than make a just 
and equitable division of the assets of the parties and 
expedite same so that each may be divorced and separated 
from each other and have a continued happy and productive 
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life apart from each other. 
Respectfully submitted this 
1985. 
day of September, 
VLAHOS & SHARP 
N>fTE ITT VLAHOS, 
Attorney for Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify, as counsel for Respondent, that four 
(4) true and correct copies of the foregoing Respondent's 
Brief were served upon counsel for the Appellant, by mailing 
same on the , ~ / 0 day of September, 1985, addressed to the 
attorney for the Appellant, B. L. Dart and John D. Parken, 
at Suite 1330, 310 South Main, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101. 
~?TTE N. VLAfcitfS, 
Attorney f<dr Respondent 
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